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P R E F A C E  
THE subject of our policy on the North-West frontier 
of India is one of great importance, as affecting 
the general welfare of our Eastern Empire, and is 
specially inte~esting s t  the present time, when mili- 
tary operations on a cousiderable scale are b e b g  
coilducted against a combination of the independent 
tribes along the frontier. 
I t  must be understood that the present condition 
of affairs is no mere sudden outbrealr on the part of 
our turbulent neighbours. Its causes lie far deeper, 
and are the consequences of events in  bygone years. 
In the following pages I have attempted to give 
a short historical summary of its varying phases, in 
the hope that I may thus assist the public in some 
degree to understand its general bewings, and to 
form a correct opinion of the policy which should 
be pursued in the future. 
JOHN ADYE, 
General. 
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INDIAN PRONTIER POLICY 
AN HISTORICAL SKETCH 
CHAPTER I 
EVENTS PRIOR TO, AND IWCLUDING, FIRST' AFGHAN WAR 
OF 1839-41 
Proposed Invasion of India by Napoleon I.-Mission of Burnes to 
CabuI-Its Prtilure-Hostility of nussia and Pereia-First Afghan 
War, 1839-41-Its Vicissihudes and Collapse. 
IN considering the important and somewhat intricate 
subject of policy on the North-Western frontier of 
our Indian Empire it will be desirable, in the first 
place, to give a concise history of the events which 
have guided our action, and which for many years 
past have exercised a preclorninating influence in that 
part of our Eastern dominion. 
Speaking generally, it may, I think, be said that 
the main features of our policy on the North-Western 
frontier have been determined by tlie gradual ad- 
vance of Russia southwards, and partly also by the 
turbulent character of the people of Afghanistan, 
and of the independent tribes who inhabit the great 
B 
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region of mountains which lie between Russia and 
1 ourselves. 
I These two circumstances-the first having been 
the most powerful-have led us into great wars and 
frontier expeditions, which as a rule have been costly, 
and in some cases unjust, and their consequences 
have not tended to strengthen our position either on 
the frontier or in India itself. 
It will be well therefore to give an outline of the 
Russian conquests in Central Asia to the north of 
afghanistan, and also of our dealings with the rulers 
of Cabul in bygone pears, and we shall then be better 
able to judge of our present position, and to deter- 
I mine the principles which should guide our North- 
Western frontier policy. 
One of the first threats of invasion of India early 
in the century was planned at Tilsit, and is thus de- 
scribed by Kaye : ' Whilst the followers of Alexander 
and Napoleon were abandoning themselves to con- 
vivial pleasures, those monarchs were spending quiet 
evenings together discussillg their future plans, and 
projecting joint schemes of conquest. It was then 
that they meditated the invasion of Hindostan by a 
confederate army uniting on the plains of Persia ; and 
no secret was made of the intention of the two great 
European potentates to commence in the following 
spring a hostile demonstration-Contre les possessions 
de la compagnie des'Indes.' 
Hiatory of the W r  in Afghanistan. 
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. I 809 TREATY WITH PERSIA '3 
The peril, however, was averted by a treaty at 
Teheran in March 1809, in which the Shah of Persia 
covenanted not to permit any European force what- 
ever to pass through Persia towards India, or towards 
the ports of that country. And so the visionary 
danger passed away. 
The old southern boundary of Russia in Central 
Asia extended froin the north of the Caspian by 
Orenburg and Orsk, across to the old Mongolian city 
of Semipalatinsk, and xas guarded by a cordon of 
forts and Cossack outposts. I t  was about 2,000 miles 
in length, and ' abutted on the great Kirghis Steppe, 
and to a certain extent controlled the tribes pasturing 
in the vicinity, but by no means established the hold 
of Russia on that pathless, and for the most part 
lifeless, waste.' 
During all the earlier years of the century, while 
we were establishing our power in India, constant 
intrigues and wars occurred in Persia, Afghanistan, 
and Central Asia ; and rumours were occasionally 
heard of threat,s against ourselves, which formed the 
subject of diplomatic treatment from time to time ; 
but in reality the scene was so distant that our 
interests were not seriously affected, and it was not 
until 1836 that they began to exercise a powerful 
influence as regards our policy on the North-Wesf 
frontier. 
' Quartedy Beview, Oot. 1865. 
B 2 
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In that year Lord Auckland was Governor- 
General, and Captain Alexander Burnes was sent on 
a commercial inission up the Indus, and through the 
Kyber Pass, to Cabul, where he was received in a 
friendly manner by the Ameer Dost Mahorned. It 
must be borne in inind that neither Scinde nor the 
Punjaub was then under our rule, so that our 
frontiers were still far distant from Afghanistan. It 
was supposed at the time that Russia was advancing 
southward towards India in league with Persia, and 
the mission of Rurnes was in reality political, its 
object being to induce the Ameer to enter into s 
friendly alliance. 
Dost; Mahomed was quite willing to meet our 
views, and offered to give up altogether any con- 
nection wit11 the two Powers named. It, however, 
sooil became apparent; that our interests were by  
no means identical; his great object, as we found, 
being to recover the Peshawur district, which 
liad been taken a few years previously by Runjeet 
Singh, while we, on the other hand, courted his 
friendship chiefly in order that his country might 
prove a barrier against the advance of Russia and 
Persia. 
These respective views were evidently divergent , 
and the issues doubtful ; when suddenly a Russian 
Envoy (Vicovitch), also on a so-called commercial 
mission, arrived at Cabul, offering the Ameer money 
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and assistance against the Sikhs. This altered the 
aspect of affairs. Burnes wrote to the Governor- 
Oenerd that the Russians were evidently trying to 
outbid us. Still some hope remained, until definite 
instructions arrived from Lord Auckland declining 
to mediate with or to act against Runjeet Singh, the 
ruler of the Pl~njaub. The Ameer felt that we made 
great demands on him but gave him nothing in 
return. I t  then became evident that the mission of 
Burnes was a failure, and in April 1838 he returned 
to India. It was our first direct effort to provide 
against a distant and unsubstantial danger, ancl it 
failed ; but unfortunately we did not take the lesson 
to heart. 
In  the mea~ztime the Shah of Persia, instigated by 
Russia, besieged Herat, but after months of fruitless 
effort, and in consec-uence of our sending troops to 
the Persian Gulf, the Shah at  length withdrew his 
army. 
I t  was not only the hostile efforts of the Shah on 
Merat in 1838 which were a cause of anxiety to the 
Plidian Government; but, as Kaye writes,l 'far out 
in the distance beyond the mountains of the Hindoo 
Koosli there was the shadow of a great Northern 
army, tremendous in its indistinctness, sweeping 
across the wilds and deserts of Central Asia towards 
the frontiers of Hindostan.' That great Northern 
I &ye's War in Afglia&tan. 
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army, as we know nonv, but did not know then, was 
tile column of Perofski, which had left Orenburg for 
the attempted coniluest of Klliva, but which subse- 
quently perished froin hardships and pestilence in the 
snowy wastes of the Barsuk Desert, north of the 
Aral. 
In  view of all the circumstances-of the supposed 
designs of Russia and Persia, and of the hostility and 
iilcessailt intrigues in Afghanistan-the Government 
of India were sorely perplexed, and opinions amongst 
the authorities widely differed as to the policy to be 
pursued. Lord Auckland, however, at length decided 
9n the assemblage of a British force for service 
across the Indus. In  his manifesto issued in 
December 1838 he first alluded to the Burnes 
mission, and tlie causes of its failure. He then 
referred to the claiins of Shah Soojah, a former ruler 
of Afghanistan (who hacl been living for some years 
in exile within our territories) and said we liad 
determined, in co-operation with the Sikhs, to restore 
him to power as Ameer of Cabul. 
I t  was arranged that Shah Soojah should enter 
Afghanistan with his own troops, such as they were, 
supported by a British army marching through 
Scincle and Beloochistan. The Governor-General 
expressed a hope that tranquillity would tllus be 
established on the frontier, and a barrier formed 
against external aggression; and he ended by pro- 
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1838 RESTORATION O F  SHAH SOOJAH 7 
claiming that when the object was accomplished the 
British army would be withdrawn. 
This was indeed a momentous decision. The 
Commander-in-Chief in India, Sir Henry Fane, had 
already given an adverse opinion, saying that ' every 
advance you make beyond the Sutlej in my opinion 
adds to your military weakness.' 
On the decision becoming known in England 
many high authorities, and the public generally, 
disapproved of the expedition." The Duke of Wel- 
lington said that ' our difficulties would commence 
where our military successes ended,' and that ' the 
consequences of crossing the Indus once, to settle a 
Government in Afghanistan, will be a perennial 
march into that country.' The Marquis Wellesley 
spoke of ' the folly of occupying a land of rocks, 
sands, deser8, and snow.' Sir Charles Metcalfe from 
the k s t  protested, and said, 'Depend upon it, the 
surest way to bring Russia down upon ourselves is 
for us to cross the Indus and meddle with the coun- 
tries beyond it.' Mr. Elphinstone wrote : ' If you 
send 27,000 men up the Bolam to Candahar, and 
can feed them, I have no doubt you can take 
Candahar and Cabuk and set up Soojah, but as for 
maintaining him in a poor, cold, strong, and remote 
country, among a turbulent people like the Afghans, 
1 own it seems to me to be hopeless. If you succeed 
you will I fear weaken the position against Russia. 
. - 
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The Afghans are neutral, and W O U I ~  have received 
your aid against invaders with gratitude. They 
\oil1 now be disaffected, and glad to join any invader 
to  drive you out.' 
Mr. Tucker, of the Court of Directors, wrote to  
tlle Duke of Wellington : 'We have contracted an 
alliance with Shah Soojah, a l t l~ou~h  he does not 
possess a rood of ground in Afghanistan, nor a rupee 
which he did not derive from our bounty as a 
quondam pensioner.' 'He added, that 'even if we 
succeed we must maintain him in the government 
by a large military force, 800 miles from our frontier 
and our resources.' 
Tlie above were strong and weighty opinions and 
arguments against the rash and distant enterprise on 
which the Government of India were about to embark. 
But there is more to be said. Independently of 
the result in Afghanistan itself, it must be borne in 
mind that the proposed line of march of the army 
necessarily lecl through Scinde and Beloochistan, 
countries which (whatever their former position may 
have been) were then independent both of the Ameer 
and of ourselves. 
The force from Bengal, consisting of about 9,500 
men of all arms, with 38,000 camp foUowers, accom- 
panied by Shah Soojah's levy, left Ferozepore in 
December, and crossing the Indus, arrived at Dadur, 
the entrance to the Bolam Pass, in March 1839% 
Dificultiea with the Ameers of Scinde at once arose, 
chiefly as to our passage through their territories ; 
but their remonstrances were disregarded, and they 
were informed that 'the day they connected them- 
selves with any other Power than England would 
be the last of their independence, if not of their 
rule.' 
The army then advanced through the Bolam, ancl 
reached Quetta on March 26th. But here again 
obstacles similar in character' to those just described 
occurred, and Sir Alexander Burnes visited the ruler 
of Beloochistan (the Khan of Khelat), demanding 
assistance, especially as to supplies of food. The 
Prince, with prophetic truth, pointed out that though 
we might restore Shah Soojah, we would not carry 
the Afghans with us, and would fail in the end. He 
alluded to the devastation which our march had 
already caused in the country; but having been 
granted a subsidy, unwillingly consented to afford us 
assistance ; and the army, leaving possible enemies in 
its rear, passed on, and reached Candahar without 
opposition in April. At  the end of June it recom- 
menced its march northwards, and Ghuznee having 
been stormed and captured, our troops without 
further fighting arrived at Cabul on April 6. Dost 
Maliomed, deserted for the time by his people, fled 
northward over the Hindoo Koosh, finding a temporary 
Kaye'8 Ww in Afghanistan. 
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refuge in Bokhara, and Shah Soojah reigned in his 
steatt. 
80 far the great expedition had apparently 
accomplished its object, and the success of the 
tripartite treaty between ourselves, the h'ikhs, and 
the new Ameer had been successfully carried out, 
almost entirely, however, by ourselves as the pre- 
dominant partner. 
The time therefore would seem to have arrived 
when, in fulfilment of Lord Auckland's proclamation, 
the British army should be withdrawn from 
Afghanistan. For the moment this appeared to be 
the case. But in reality it was not so, and our 
position soon became dangerous, then critical, and at 
last desperate. In the first place, the long line of 
communicstion was liable st any time to be 
interrupted, as already mentioned; then, again, the 
arrival of Shah Soojah had excited no enthusiasm ; 
and the very fact that we were foreigners in language, 
religion and race, rendered our presence hateful to 
his subjects. In  short, the new Ameer was, and 
continued to be, a mere puppet, supported in 
authority by British bayonets. 
These conditions were apparent from the first 
day of his arrival, and grew in intensity until the 
end. Shah Soojah himself soon discovered that his 
authority over his people was almost nominal ; and 
although he chafed at our continued presence in the' 
1839 WITHDRAWAL OF TROOPS I I 
counbry, he also felt that the day of our departure 
would be the last of his reign, and that our with- 
drawal was under the circumstances impossible. 
But the situation was equally complicated from our 
own point of view. If, as originally promised, the 
British troops were withdrawn, the failure of the 
expedition would at once become apparent by the 
anarchy which would ensue. On the other hand, to 
retain an army in the far-distant mountains of 
Afghanistan would not only be a breach of faith, 
but, while entailing enormous expense, would deprive 
India of soldiers who might be required elsewhere. 
After lengthy consideration, it was decided to 
reduce the total of our force in the country, while 
retaining a hold for the present on Cabul, Ghuznee, 
and Candahar, together with the passes of the Kylser 
and Bolam. In short, the British army was weakly 
scattered about i11 a region of mountains, amongst a 
hostile people, and with its long lines of communica- 
tion insufficiently guarded. Both in a military and 
a political point of view the position was a false and 
dangerous one. 
General Sir John Keane, who was about to return 
to India, writing at the time, said Mark my words, 
i t  will not be long before there is here some signal 
catastrophe.' During the summer of 1840 there 
were troubles both in the Kyber and Bolam passes. 
In  the former the tribes, incensed at not receiving 
12 INDIAN FRONTIER POLICY I 840 
sufficient subsidies, attacked the outposts and 
plundered our stores ; while in Beloochistan matters 
were so serious that a British force was sent, and 
captured Kllelat, the Khan being killed, and part of 
his territory handed over to Shah 8oojah.l Rumours 
from Central Asia also added to our anxieties. 
Although the failure of the Russian attempt on 
Khiva became known some months later, it excited 
apprehension at the time amongst our political 
officers in Cabul. Sir Alexander Rurnes, during the 
winter of 1839, expressed opinions m-l~ich were 
curiously inconsistentwith each other. ' I maintain,' 
he said, 'that man to be an enemy to his country 
who recommends a soldier to be stationed west of 
the Indus ; ' while at the same moment he advocated 
the advance of our troops over the Bindoo Koosh 
into Balkh, so as to be ready to meet the Russians in 
the following May. 
Sir William McNaghten, the chief political officer 
in Cabul, went still further, and in April 1840 not 
only urged a march on Bokhara, but also contem- 
plated sending a Mission to Kokand, in order, as he 
said, 'to frustrate the knavish tricks of the Russians 
in that quarter.' 
Our position, however, at that time was sufficiently 
precarious without adding to our anxieties by 
' In  the life of Sir Robert Sandeman, recently published, it is stated 
t b t  the alleged treachery of Mehrab Khan, which cost him his life, 
We8 on raubsequent inquiry not confirmed. 
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distant expeditions in Central Asia, even had tile 
Russians established themselves in the Principalities, 
which at that time was not the case. Not only was 
Afghanistan itself seething with treachery and 
intrigues from one end to the other, but the Siklls 
in the Punjaub, our nominal allies, had, since the death 
of Runjeet Singh, become disloyal and out of hand. 
Beloocllistan was in tumult ; the tribes in the Kyber, 
ever ready for mischief, incessantly threatened our 
cominunications ; so that we were certainly i n  no 
condition to enter upon further dangerous expedi- 
tions against distant imaginary foes. 
Sir Jasper Nicholls, the Commander-in-Chief, 
strongly objected to any advance. ' I n  truth,' he 
said, ' we are much weaker now than in 1838.' 
During the latter months of 1840, and in 1841, 
matters became steadily worse, and all Afghanistan 
seemed ripe for revolt. 'We are in a stzw Iiere,' 
wrote Sir William McNaghten in September ; ' i t  is 
reported that the wliole country on this side tlle 
Oxus is up in favour of Dost Mahomed, who is 
certainly advancing in great strength.' Again, in a 
letter to Lord Auckland, he said ' that affairs in this 
quarter have the worst possible appearance '-and 
he quoted the opinion of Sir Willoughby Cotton, tllat 
' unless the Bengal troops are installtly strengthened 
we cannot hold tlie country.' 
At this criticaI period, however, Dost Mahomed 
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distant expeditions in Central Asia, even lla(l tile 
Russians established themselves in the Principnlities, 
which at that time was not the case. Not only mas 
Afghanistan itself seetlling with trencllery 
intrigues from one end to the other, but tlle Siklls 
in the Punjaub, our nominal allies, had, since tlle deatll 
of Runjeet Singh, become disloyal and out of hand. 
Beloochistan was in tumult ; the tribes in the Iiyber, 
ever ready for mischief, incessantly tlire,zte~ied our 
com~nu~rications ; so tllat we mere certai~lly in no 
coiidition to enter upon further dangerous espcdi- 
tioils against distant imagina~y foes. 
Sir Jasper Nicholls, the Comm,z~ider-in-Chief, 
strongly objected to any advance. ' 111 trutli,' lie 
said, ' we are much weaker now than in 1838.' 
During the latter months of 1840, snil in 1841, 
matters became steadily worse, and all Afghanistan 
seemed ripe for revolt. 'We are in a stew here,' 
mote Sir William McNaglltei~ in September ; 'it is 
reported that the whole country on this side tlie 
Oxus is up in favour of Dost Maliorned, who is 
certainly advancing in great strength.' Again, in a 
letter to Lord Auckland, he said ' that affairs in this 
quarter have the worst possible appearance'-and 
he quoted the opinion of Sir Willougl~by Cotton, that 
' unless the Bengal troops are instantly strengtheued 
we cannot hold the country.' 
At this critical period, I~owever, Dost Mahomed 
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was heavily defeated at Bamian, on tlie Hind00 
~ ~ o s l l ,  voluntarily surrendering sllortly afterwards, 
and for the moment prospects looked brighter ; but 
the clouds soon gathered again, and the end was a t  
hand. 
The Governor-General of India had throughout 
the whole war wisely and steadfastly resisted the 
proposed further operations in Central Asia ; and 
the Court of Directors in London wrote as follows : 
' We pronounce our decided opinion that, for many 
years to come, the restored monarchy will have need 
of a British force in order to maintain peace in its 
own territory, and prevent aggression from without.' 
And they go on : ' We again desire you seriously 
to consicler which of the two alternatives (a speedy 
retreat from Afghanistan, or a considerable increase 
of the military force in that country) you may feel i t  
your duty to adopt. We are convinced that you 
have no middle cour,se to pursue with safety and 
with honour.' The Government of India, hesitating 
to the last, failed in adopting either of the alterna- 
tives. 
In  November, 1841, Sir Alexander Burnes vas 
treacherously murdered by a mob in Cabul, which 
was followed by an insurrection, andsthe defeat of our 
troops.. General Elphinstone, who was in command, 
writing to Sir 3V. McNaghten on November 24, said 
that ' from the want of provisions and fmage, the 
'1841 A DISASTROUS RETREAT 'IS 
reduced state of our troops, the large number of 
wounded and sick, the difficulty of defending the - 
extensive and ill-situated cantonment we occupy, the 
near approach of winter, our communications cut off, 
no prospect of relief, and the whole country in arms 
against us, I am of opinion that it is not feasible any 
longer to maintain our position in this country, and 
that you ought to avail yourself of the offer to 
negotiate that has been made to you,' 
This was conclusive. Our Envoy early in Decem- 
ber met the Afghan chief& and agreed that we sliould 
immediately evacuate the country, and that Dost 
Mahomed, who was in exile in India, should return. 
On December 23, Sir William McNaghten was 
treacherously murdered at a conference with the 
Afghan Sirdars, within sight of the British canton- 
ment, and then came the end. 
The British force at Cabul, leaving its guns, 
stores and treasure behind, commenced its retreat on 
January 6, 1842; but incessantly attacked during 
its march, and almost annihilated in the Koord Cabul 
Pass, it ceased to exist as an organised body. 
' General Elphinstone and other officers, invited to a 
conference by Akbar Khan, were forcibly detained as 
hostages, and on January 13 a solitary' Englishman 
(Dr. Brydon) arrived at Jellalabad, being, with 
the exception of a few prisoners, the sole remaining 
representative of the force. 
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I have given this short sketch of the first Afghan 
mar because, disastrous as it  was, the causes of our 
failure were due throughout far more to rash and 
mistaken policy than to any shortcomings of the 
British troops engaged. Kaye in his ' History ' gives a 
clear summary of its original object and unfortunate 
results : ' The expedition across the Indus was under- 
tiken with the object of creating in Afghanistan a 
barrier against encroachment from the west.' ' The 
advance of the British army was designed to check 
the aggression of Persia on the Afghan frontier, and 
to baffle Russian intrigues by the substitution of a 
friendly for ail unfriendly Power in the countries 
beyond the Indus. After an enormous waste of 
blood and treasure, we left every town and village 
of Afghanistan bristling with our enemies. Before 
the British army crossed the Indus the English name 
had been honoured in Afghanistan. Some dim 
traditions of the splendour of Mr. Elphinstone7s 
Mission had been all that the Afghans associated 
with their thoughts of the English nation, but in 
their place we left galling memories of the progress 
of a desolating army.' 
The history of the war from first to last deserves 
careful consideration ; and if the lessons taught by 
it are taken to heart, they wil l  materially assist in 
determining the principles which should guide our 
policy on the North-West frontier of India. 
CHAPTER I1 
EVENTS PRIOR, AND LEADING UP, 'PO SECOND 
AFGFIAN WAR 
Conquest of Xhiva, Bolrharrt, and Rokand by Russia-British Conquest 
of Scinde end tho Punj&ub-Our Policy with the Frontier T'ibes- 
Tranty of 1857 with Dost Mahorned-Shere Ni succeeds as Ameer, 
1868-Wns of 1878-Abdul Rnhmnn becomes Ameer--Withdrawal 
of British Army from Afghanistan, 1881. 
FOR a few years subsequent to the war, our frontier 
policy happily remained free from complications, and 
it will be desirable now to refer sliortly to the pro- 
gress of Russia in Central Asia, and of her conquests 
of the decaying Principalities of Khiva, Bokhara and 
Kokand. 
Previous to 1847 the old boundary line of 
Russia south of Orenburg abutted on the great 
Kirghis Steppe, a zone (as the late Sir H. Rawlinson 
told us) of almost uninhabited desert, stretching 
2,000 miles from west to east, and nearly 1,000 from 
north to south, which bad hitherto acted as a 
buffer between Russia and the Mahornedan Princi- 
palities below the Aral. 
'It was in 1847, contemporaneously ~ i t h  our 
' Parliamentary Papers : Afghanistan, 1878. 
2 Extract from Quarterly Reuiew, October 1866. 
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final conquest of the Punjaub, that the curtain rose 
on the aggressive Russian drama in Central Asia 
which is not yet played out. Russia had enjoyed 
the nominal dependency of the Kirghis-Kozzacks of 
the little horde who inhabited the western division 
of the great Steppe since 1730; but, except in the 
immediate vicinity of the Orenburg line, she had 
little real control over the tribes. In 1847-48, how- 
ever, she erected three important fortresses in the 
very heart of the Steppe: These important works- 
the only permanent constructions which had hitherto 
been attempted south of the line-enabled Russia, for 
the first time, to dominate the western portio~l of the 
Steppe and to command the great routes of commu- 
nication with Central Asia. But the Steppe forts 
were after all a mere means to an end ; they formed 
the conilecting link between the old frontiers of the 
empire and the long-coveted line of the Jaxartes, 
and simultaneously with their erection arose Fort  
Aralsk, near the embouchure of the river.' 
The Russians having thus crossed the great 
desert tract and established themselves on the 
Jaxartes (Sir Daria), from that time came permanently 
into contact with the three Danates  of Central Asia,' 
and their progress since that date has been compara- 
tively easy and rapid. 
The Principalities had no military organisation 
which would enable them to withstand a great Power ; 
s 1847 RUSSIAN ADVANCE IN CENTRAL ASIA 19 
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their troops and those of Russia were frequently in 
conflict of late years ; but the battles r e r e  in a 
military sense trivial ; and the broad result is, that 
Eussia has been for some years predominant through- 
out the whole region ; and her fronsiers are now 
contilluous with the northern provinces of both 
Afghanistan and Persia. I t  is this latter point which 
is the important one, so far as we are concerned, but 
before entering into its details, it will be well to 
consider the nature of the great country over which 
ltussia now rules. 
Until within the last few years our information 
as to its general character was very limited ; but the 
accounts of numerous recent travellers all concur 
in describing it as consisting for the most part of 
sterile deserts, deficient in food, forage, fuel and 
water. There are a certain ilumber of decayed 
ancient cities here and there, and there are occa- 
sional oases of limited fertility, but the general 
conditions are as just described. Witli the exception 
of the one railway from the Caspian to Samarcand, 
the means of transport are chiefly pack nnimaly. 
Speaking roughly, the dominions of Russia in Central 
Asia, south of Orenburg, may be taken as almost 
equal in geographical extent to those of our Indian 
&pire ; but there if; this striking difference betmeen 
the two, that whilst the population of India is conl- 
pqted at 250 millions, that of Central Asia, even ;at 
c 2 
, " 
I 
I 
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the highest computation, is only reckoned at four o r  
five millions, of mhom nearly half are nornaclic- 
that is, they wander about, not from choice, but  in 
' i search of foocl and pasturage. The extreme 
scantiness of the population is of itself a rough 
measure of the general desolation. 
The military position of Russia in Central Asia, 
therefore, is that of a great but distant Power, which 
during the last fifty years has overrun and taken pos- 
session of extended territories belonging to fanatical 
Mahornedan tribes. The people themselves are, 
many of them, marlike and hostile ; but they are badly 
armed, hwe  no discipline, training, or leaders, and are 
not therefore in a position to vithstand the advance 
of regular troops. Consequently Russia is enabled to 
hold the couiltry with a comparatively small force of 
scattered detachments, which are, however, supplied 
with arms, munitions and stores under great diffi- 
culties from far distant centres, and her troops are 
practically incapable of concentration. Indeed the 
farther they go the weaker they become ; the very 
magnitude of the area being an additional cause of 
weakness. This is a condition somewhat precarious 
in itself, and would certainly not appear to be an  
alarming one as a basis of attack against our Empire, 
even were India close at hand. 
While Russia, however, was completing the 
subjugation of the Principalities, and advancing her 
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frontiers until they became conterminous with the 
nortlicrn provinces of Afghanistan and Persia, the 
Government of India, by the great wars of 1843 and 
184 9,. ' ' ' j~avin~ annexed Scinde ancl the Pmlj aub, 
advailced our frontiers in a sinlilar manner, so that the 
people both of Beloochistan aiid Afghanistan, hitherto 
far remote from our dominions, now became our 
neighbours. 
In the life of Sir Robert Sandeman receiitIy 
published, a very interesting account is given, not 
only of the nature of the country along tlie border, 
but of the policy pursued for many years with the 
independent tribes. I t  says : 'By the conquest of 
Scincle i11 1843, and the annexation of tlie Punjaub in 
1849, the North-West frontier of India was advanced 
across the river Indus to the foot of the rocky 
mountains which separate the plains of the Indus 
vaIley from the higher plateaus of Afghanistan and 
Khelat. These rnou~itaiiz ranges formed a vast 
irregular belt of independent or semi-independent 
territory, extending from Cashmere southward to the 
sea near Kurrachee, a total length of about 1,200 
miles.' The belt of territory above described was 
"nhabited by fierce marauding tribes, often at war 
with each other, ever and anon harrying the plains 
of the Punjaub and Scinde, and the constant terror 
of the trade caravans duriizg their journey through 
the passes.' 
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The policy pursued for many years is thus de- 
scribed : ' The disasters of the first Afghan war, and 
the tragical episode of Klielat, were fresh in men's re- 
collections, and created a strong feeling against politi- 
cal interference with tribes beyond our border ' . . . . 
'Accordingly, from the rery first, the system of 
border defence maintained by the Pulijaub Govern- 
ment v-as not purely military, but partly military, 
pal'tljr political and conciliatory. While the passes 
were carefully x-atchecl, every means was taken for 
the promotion of friendly intercourse.' Roads were 
niade, steamers started on the Indus, and iiluildation 
canals developed along the border. 
So long as they were friendly the tribesmen had 
free access to our territory, could llold lalzd, enlist in 
our army, and ~llake free use of our marlrets. As 
a result, tlie deadly hatred formerly prevailirig be- 
tween tlie Sikhs and the hill tribes soon disappeared ; 
raids became exceptional ; cultivation increased ; the 
bazaars of our frontier stations teenzed with Afghans, 
with trains of laden camels, who at the close of the 
season returned laden with our goods. Disputes 
vere volulltarily referred by independent tribesmen 
for the arbitration of British officers. Such (it is 
stated in the life of Sir Robert Sandeman) were the 
results of Lawrence's frontier policy, and no words 
are required to emphasise these excellent arrange- 
ments, which remained in force for many years. , 
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Before leaving this part of the subject, it may be 
as well to anticipate a little and to allude to the 
successful part taken by Sir Robert Sandeman in 
1876 on his appointmelll; as our agent to the hllan 
of Khelat. I t  is importarit in the first place to 
mention, that whilst in Afghanistan the tribes all 
along the frontier were for tlie most part inde- 
pendenl; of the Ameer of Cabul, and were ruled by 
their own ' jirgahs ' or councils, in Beloochistan the 
mode of government was fio far different that tlie 
chiefs, whilst acknowledging the Khan as their 
hereditary ruler, were entitled, not only to govern 
their own tribes, but to take part in the general 
administration of the country as the coizstitutional 
advisers of the paramount chief. Tlie dangers 
arising from the viciility of three powerful kingdoms, 
Persia, Afghauistall arid Scinde, had no doubt led 
them to perceive the ilecessity of co-operation, whicll 
was established about the middle of the eighteenth 
century. Although the collstitution as above de- 
scribed secured to the confederated tribes nearly a 
century of prosperity and peaceful government, it so 
happened that for some years before 1876, o~ving to 
the weakness of the then ruler, and partly to 
turbulence of the chiefs, the government of the 
country fell into disorder, and the commerce 
through the Bolam Pass altogether ceased. 
' From 3872 to 1876 Lord Northbrook was Viceroy 
I '  . I of India, and one of his last acts before leaving was 
' the appointment of Colonel Sandeman as our Envoy, 
11 J vith a view to nlediate between the Khan and his 
r 
subordinates, and which proved successful. The l J 
principal terms which were finally accepted by the I 1 '  
I I 
. I Khan and his tribal chiefs were, that their Foreign . 
I 
d l policy was to be under onr guidance, and we were also 
to be the referee in case of internal disputes ; that 
the commerce. of the Bolam was to be opened and 
protected, the annual subsidy hitherto granted to the 
Klian of 5,0001. being doubled to cover the necessary 
expenditure ; and, findy, that a British Agent with a 
suitable contingent should be established at Quetta. 
I t  is important to observe that the negotiations were 
conducted tl~roughont in a spirit of conciliation, and 
that their beneficial results remain in force to the 
present day. 
The policy pursued for many years on the Afghan 
frontier, altllough regulated by the same general 
principles as in Khelat, was not alt>ogether so rapidly 
accomplished, or so entirely successful. The circum- 
stances were in some degree different and less simple. 
In  the first place the frontier was 800 miles long, and 
, 
was inhabited by Afghan tribes, who were more pre- 
datory and intractable than the Beloochees ; they were 
not only independent of each other, but for the most 
part acknowledged no allegiance to the Ameer of 
Cabul. Border disputes therefore had to be settled 
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, 
vi th  individual chiefs ; and no opportunity aas 
offered for our mediation in internal feuds, or for 
joint agreement on external policy, as was so success- 
fully accomplished by Sandeman in Beloochistan. 
There was no general federation with which we could 
enter into negotiation. As a consequence, we were 
compelled to maintain a large force ailcl fortified 
posts along the frontier; and many punitive expe- 
ditions became necessary from time to time against 
lawless offending tribes. Still, on the whole, and 
coilsidering the difficulties of the situation, the policy 
of conciliation, subsidies, and of non-interference 
with their internal affairs, gradually succeeded ; 
raids once chronic became exceptional, and were 
dealt with rather as matters of frontier policy than of 
war.l 
I t  must also be remembered, as an additional 
complication, that in annexiug the Punj aub, a1 though 
i t  is essentially the country of the Sikhs, who are 
Bindoos, the inhabitants of the trans-Indus districts 
are for the most part what are termed Punjaubee 
Mussulmen, that is, Afghans, in race, religion and 
language. 
From what has been said as to our dealings with 
the border tribes, it will be evident that while our 
difficulties were continuous and often serious, still, 
See Parliamentary  paper^: Afghanistam, 1878, page 30, and 
Bsloochistan, No.  8, 1878. . 
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they were chiefly local ; and that the defence of the 
Einpire on that frontier against foreign aggression 
depended in a great measure on our relations with 
the ruler of Afglianistan itself. When Dost Mahomed, 
after the great war, returned in 1843 to his former 
position as Ameer of that distracted country, it was 
hardly to be expected that, although acquiescing in his 
reinstatement, Ire should be regarded by him in a 
friendly light ; still, some years passed away without 
any important change in our relative positions, one 
way or the other. 
I11 1855, Lord Dalhousie was Governor-General, 
and a treaty was made with Dost Mal~orned, by which 
both parties agreed to respect each other's territories. 
In  January, 1857, a still more important one followed. 
We were then once more at  war with Persia; and a t  
a meeting between Sir John Lawrence and the Ameer, 
an agreement was entered into that Dost Mahomed, 
acting in co-operation with us, should receive 10,0001. 
a montli for military purposes, to continue during 
the war ; that English oficers should reside in his 
country temporarily, to keep the Indian Government 
infomecl, but not to interfere with the administration, 
and that when peace ensued they should be with- 
drawn, and a native agent alone remain as our 
repre~entative.~ I t  is important to note that this 
' In view of the strong objection to  the presence of English officera 
in Afghanistan, Sir John Lawrence intimated to the Viceroy of India, 
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friendly treaty was made at Peshawur, just before the 
great Mutiny, and that the Ameer, though urged by 
his people to attack us in our hour of danger, re- 
mained faithful, and would not allow them to cross 
the border. 
Dost Mahomed died in June, 1863, and for some 
years after 11is death family feuds and intestine wars 
occurred as to his successor, during which we care- 
fully abstained from interference, and were prepared 
to acknowledge the defacto ruler. Ultimately, in 1868, 
his son Shere Ali established his authority in Afgllani- 
stan, and was acknowlerlged accordingly. Lorcl. 
Lawrence was then the Viceroy, and in a despatch 
to the Secretary of State expressed his views as 
regards the advances of Russia. After pointing 
out that they were now paramount in Central 
Asia, he suggested a mutual agreement as to our 
respective spheres and relations with the tribes and 
nations with whom we were now both in contact, 
and he went on to welcome the civilising effect of 
Russian government over the wild tribes of the 
Steppes, and pointed out that if Russia were assured 
of our loyal feeling in these matters, she would have 
no jealousy in respect of our alliance with the 
Afghans. 
. The Secretary of State (Sir Stafford Northcote) 
thet he had given an assurnnoe to Dost Mahomed that it shouldnot be 
enforced unless imperatively necessary. 
ISDlAN FRONTIER POLICY 
rt.ij\it.d tllnt the c o ~ i q ~ ~ e s t s  wliich Russia had made, 
atid nllp:tre~~tly is still making, in Central Asia, appear 
jrt* tile natural result of the circumstances in 
~ ~ ~ b i ~ * l ~  PIIC' fillils herself placed, and to afford 110 
gn#uriil nvlieterer for representations indicative of 
ni.ilit.il ~1 or alann on the part of this eou~ltry.' I t  is a 
gn.:~t aiisfc~rtu~ie that such sensible, conciliatory views 
t l i t l  !tot c*onti~lue to guide our policy in the events 
at:ii$l :L l'iw p a r s  later led us into the second great 
\i :is irl ;\fghnl~istan. *. 
+ltt.ri~ Ali clici not inherit tlie great qualities of 
hi- F..i:llor, : u ~ i  was also somewliat discontented that 
c n  1r;til not   betted llis cause during the internal 
:tc lliPrlvs in A.fp1innistan. However, in 1869 he met 
l i ~ ~ r t l  11 :~!.a) at Ulubxlla, and after careful discussion it 
\,:a- :~~rcc.cl that we sliould abstain from sending 
J!riti.l~ ofiira~rs nctross the frontier and from interfer- 
ilig ill ,\f'jIl:ul nihirs; tliat our desire was that  a 
+troi~g, friendly, aud independent Government should 
t~ eht:tl)lislle(i in tliat country. It  a a s  further 
{lr.t*iclt*tl to give Sliere Ali considerable pecuniary 
:i+i*t:~i~ce, and presents of arms from time to time. 
' 1 ' 1 1 ~  Anleer, while gratified at these results, wished us 
:rl*o to give x dynastic pledge as to his lineal descen- 
tlants, wllic11, however, was not acceded to. I n  1873 
Iurd Sortllbrook was Viceroy of India, and a 
further coriference took place at Silnla with t l ~ e  
hileer's Prime uinister, elriefly as to the nortllern 
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were at the time somemllnt uncertnin, and a matter of 
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This sornewhat delicate question was, liolr-ever, 
settled in a friendly manner by Lorci Gr:~nville, tllen 
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. Prince 
Gortscllalroffs find despatcli to him on tlie sul~ject 
was as f o l l o ~ s  : ' 'The divergence wllicll esis1,eil in 
our views was with reg:~ril to the frontiers assigliecl 
t.o the donliilion of Sliere Ali. Tlie E~iglisll Govc?ni- 
ment includes witliin them Uadakslian nxlc2 TVakknn, 
which according to our views enjoyed a certain 
independeilce. Co~isidering the dificultg experienced 
in establishing the fr~cls in a11 tlieir details in tliose 
distant parts ; consideririg tlle greater facilities wliicli 
the British Government possesses for collectir~g pre- 
cise detail, and above all considering our misli not to 
give to this question of detail greater irnportarice 
than is due to it, we (10 not refilse to accept tlie 
boundary line laid down by England. We are the 
more inclined to tlJs act of courtesy as the English 
Government engages to use a11 its influeilce wit11 Shere 
Ali in order to induce him to maintain a peaceful 
attitude, as well as to insist on his giving up a11 
measures of aggression or further conquest. This 
influence is indisputable. I t  is based, not only on 
the material and moral ascende~lcy of England, but 
L Central Asia, 1878-C. 6gS. 
30 INDIAN FRONTIER POLICY 1873 
also on the subsidies for which Shere Ali is indebted 
to her. Such being the case, we see in this 
assurance a real guarantee for the maintenance of 
pence.' 
Prince Gortschakoff admitted more than once that 
the Emperor of Russia looked upon Afghanistan as 
completely outside the sphere of Russian influence, 
and witliin that of ours ; at the same time, claiming 
similar independence for Russia in Central Asia. 
During the next few years, subsequent to the 
Sim'la conference, Shere Ali, though he had received 
considerable assistance from us, both in money and 
arms, was not altogether satisfied, and one or two 
incidentsoccurred during that period which gave him 
umbrage. Lord Northbrook, the Viceroy in 1875, was 
not unavare of tlie somewhat cold and capricious spirit 
of the Ameer, but in writing to London he  pointed 
out that Shere Ali's situation was difficult, not only 
from the risk of revolution a t  home, but also of 
attack from abroad, but that on the whole he was to 
be relied on. 
A change, however, was coming over the scene, 
and our policy reverted from conciliation to compul- 
sion, I t  was a critical period in the history of 
frontier policy, and demands careful consideration. 
I t  must not be forgotten that although amongst 
those best qualified to judge the majority had long 
been opposed to advance and congueat in territories 
*ICY 1875 ALARhIIST VIEWS 
.. ~ l i  is ~ 8 f '  beyonrl our Nort1h-West frontier, anil entert;nined 
we see Ihq@bted but little fear of Russinu aggressive power, still there 
mainter( were others-men of long experience, mllo llnd 
"~ce d filled high positions in India-mllo held different 
views ; and it is probd~le that not only snccessive 
British Governments, but the public generally, ~vllo 
have no time for caref~~lly weighing the diverse 
aspects of the subject, mrere illfluencecl sometinlea one 
connected with our world-wide Empire this illust 
always be inore or less the case. For instance, the 
late Sir H. Ramrlinson, a few pears before the seconcl 
Afghan war, took a very alarmist view of the 
progress of Russia, not oilly in Central Asia but 
also in Asia Minor. He considered that her advance 
from Orenburg mras only part of one great scheme of 
iavasion ; ancl he averred that the conquest of the 
:ult, not ollly Caucasus had given her such a strong position that 
but also ,f there was no military or pllysical obstacle to the 
continuous march of Russia from the Arsxes to tlie 
1ndus.l He described it as the unerring cer- 
tainty of a law of nature. But, througllout, he 
ignores distances, blots out the mountains, deserts, 
and aricl plains of Persia and Afghanistan, and takes 
no account of the warlike races who would bm t l ~ e  
path. . I t  requires a very large map to embrace all 
by had 10Qg the details of 'this widespread strategy. 
2 temitot'ies . !  
, ~a~lilittmentnr~ '~apers ,  Afgl~ani~tam, 1878; 
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Sonle account has already been given of tlie 
wenkness, iri a military poilit of view, of Russia in 
Cjentral Asia, and of the distallce of h e r  scattered 
troops from the main resources of the Empire. But, 
in addition, i t  must be remembered that  the  moun- 
tains of Afglianistan also forin a natural and  enduring 
l~nrrier against a furtlier advance. The great  Hindoo 
Koosh range, running all along the northern part 
of tliat country, forins indeed the real  scientific 
frontier between tlie two Empires, the few passes 
over its s11o~vy crests ranging from 12,000 to  18,000 
feet liigli, and only open for a few months i n  the 
pear. 
rlilotlier supposed line of advance for a Russian 
army, 11:mnlely by tlie Pamirs, has of late years beer1 
brought forward; but its main features are more 
discouraging tliail those of any other. This elevated 
region coi~sists of a Inass of bare snow-capped moun- 
tailis attaining elevations of over 25,000 feet, inter- 
sected by plateaux almost as devoid of vegetation as 
the nlountains themselves. The lakes a r e  about 
12,000 feet above the sea, the population is scanty, 
and consists chiefly of nomads in search of food and 
pasture during tlie short summer ; so that  although 
the Russians might, if unop"posed, possibly move in 
small isolated detachments carrying tlieir own food 
and munitioris over the Pamirs, it would only b e  to  
lose themselves in the gorges of the Himalayas. 
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The conditions above mentioned are for the most 
part permanent. Russia may not, and probably has 
not, any intention of trying to invade and conquer 
India-but she has not the power, which is a far more 
important consideration. 
To return to the position of affairs previous to 
the second Afghan war.l Early in 1875, Lord 
Northbrook, the Governor-General, received a rles- 
patch from the Government at  home, pointing out 
that the infor ination received from Afghanistall, not 
only in respect to internal intrigues but also as 
regards the influence of foreign Powers, was scanty, 
and not always trustworthy. He was, therefore, 
instructed to procure the assent of the Ameer to the 
establishment of a British Agency a t  Herat, and also 
at Candal~ar. 
Tlie Viceroy of India and his Coullcil having con- 
sulted various experienced officers on the subject, 
replied in June, that in their opinion the present 
time and circumstances were unsuitable for taking 
the initiative. They pointed out that the Sirdars 
and many of the people of Afghanistan would st,rongly 
object, and that i n  the Ameer's somewhat insecure 
position he could not afford to disregard their feelings 
in the matter. They advised patience and con- 
' ciliation. 
See Afghanistan, 1878, published by Secretery of Stste for India, 
p. 128 et  aeq. 
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? - The Government of India, in January 1876, again polite 
I 
1 urged the undesirability of forcing the hands of the 
\ Ameer, and pointed out that his objections to Eilglisli 
In November 1875 a second despatch was received t Afglia 
from England, reiterating the necessity of more com- i Ameel plete information as to Afghanistan, especially in sion, 
officers mere not from a feeling of disloyalty, and that Gover 
to force his hands was not desirable. Tliey did not refusa 
apprehend any desire of interference on the part of Russia 
I 
view of recent Russian advances in Central Asia; 
and the Viceroy was directed to send a Mission to  
Cabul without delay, to confer with the Ameer on 
Central Asia, and requesting that British officers 
should be placed on the frontier to match the course 1 
Russia, and they concluded by alluding to the careful 
friend 
on lo 
reque 
hilnse 
T1 
corlciliatory policy carried out by Lords Canning, 
I 
Lawrence, ancl Mayo, as giving the best promise of 
peace, ancl seLisfactory results in Afghanistan. Con- 
I sequently they deprecated the proposed action by  
I I the Home Government in forcing British officers upon 
Shere Mi. In  April 1876 Lord Northbrook quitted 
India, and was succeeded by Lord Lytton; and a 
further reply from Lord Salisbury, the Secretary of 
State for India, was received by the Viceroy, It 
reiterated that the Government a t  home considered, 
our trans-frontier relations unsatisfactory ; that 
permatlent British Agencies should be established Is! 
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Afghanistan ; and that we were willing to athrd the 
Allleer rnaterinl snppor t against urip revoked : I Z ~ ~ C S -  
sion, our object being to rllaintniri a strong nncl 
friendly Power in tliat c,ouiitrp. The despntcli went 
on to say tlnL slroulcl the Anleer decline to meet our 
request, lie slionlil l)e informerl tliat he was isolating 
lliiilself from as at liis peril. 
The next step mas t:~kcn in &lay, when tlie hmccr 
was invited to lqeceive n special Mission, ~vliic!li lle 
politely declinecl. I n  October our ilative Agent :it 
Cabul caine to Siinln nnclhacl an interview wit11 Idorcl 
1,g tton, ~vlio reiterated the clemnn(1s of the Urit is11 
Goverinnent, pointing out that in tlic evelit of :E 
refusal there was notliing to prevent onr joining 
Russia in wiping dfghnnistnn out of the liinp alto- 
yeQier, of wllicli Sliere Ali was duly iuforme(1. Iii 
J:~nuary IS77 a fiilsl elfix.-t wtls m:~dc to collie to 
terms, and .Sir Lewis Pelly arlil the Afgllau Priinc 
$Iinister, Noor Mnliorned, had a. collferclice at  
Peshawur. The first, nn(l irlrleerl tlle only point 
iliscusse(1, wa.s the deinnncl tliat British rt?pres(!lit:~- 
tives should reside in Afghanistan, which was a 
sine qua nnn. Noor Malloined pntliet,icn-lly plcatlerl 
that Lorcls Lnt~rence, May o, and Nortllbrook, sucees- 
sive Vicerojrs, had a 1  in turn promised that this 
sliould not be insisted on ; and lie ended by saying 
that Sliere Ali would rather perish tlinli subillit. I t  
r a s  evident that further discussion was useless, and 
n 2 
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tile conference was closed ; Noor Mahorned, who was 
ill, dying sliortly afterwards. In  March 1877 our 
native Agent at Cabul was witlidrawn, and direct 
conlzriunication wit11 Shere Ali ceased. 
I have given the above ~dsurnk of the correspond- 
ence in 1875-77, and of the abortive efforts to induce 
the Ameel- to comply with our demands, because it 
is evident that if he continued to resist compulsion 
lrlust almost inevitably ensue. At about the same 
time, Quettn, in the Bolam, was occupied by a con- 
siderable British force, which was naturally regarded 
as a threat on Afghanistan. A ~oncent~ration of 
troops also took place in the Northern Punjaub, and 
preparations mere made for the constructioil of 
bridges over the Indus. All these were indications 
of coming war. I t  must also be noted that our 
relations with Russia in Europe were much strained 
at the time, so that probably the preparations in 
India were in some degree due to tlie apprehension 
of mar in otlier parts of the world. 
d"3 
In  the summer of 1878 a R~lssian Envoy arrived 
at Cabul, which under the circumstances is ,hardly to 
he wondered at. Some months however elapsed, 
and it was not until November 1878 that war was 
declared. Lord Lytton, the Viceroy, in his procla- 
mation stated: That for ten years we had been 
friendly to Bhere Ali ; had assisted him with money 
and arms ; and had secured for him formal recog- 
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nition of his northern frontier by Russia.' I t  went 
on to state, tliat in return he had requited us witll 
active ill-will; had closed the passes and allowed 
British traders to be plundered ; ancl had endem- 
oured to stir up religious hatred against us. I t  
then pointed out that whilst refusing a British 
Mission he had received one from Russia ; ancl elided 
by saying that we had no quarrel with the Afghans, 
but only wit11 Shere Ali himself. 
From official correspondeilce published subsc- 
quentlyl it appeared that in entering Afghanistan 
0111- chief object at the outset was to eslablisli  hat 
was called a strategical triangle, by the occupation of 
Cabul, Ghuznee ancl Jellalabad ; and it mas statecl 
that by holding this position, entrenched behind a 
rampart of mountains, we should have the power of 
debouching on the plains of the Oxus against 
Russia in Central Asia ! ' I t  is difficult,' said Lord 
Lytton, ' to imagine a more commanding strategical 
position.' The events of the war, I~owever, soon put 
an end to this somewhat fanciful strategy. 
In November 1878 the British forces entered the 
eouiltry by three main routes, theKyber, the Koorum, 
and the Bolam, and hard fighting at once ensued 01.- 
the two northern ones. The results mere immediate : 
Shere Ali fled northwards, and died soon after. His 
soil, Yakoob Khan, assumed temporarily the positioii 
Pmlilil~mentary Papers, Afghanistan, 1881, No. 2.-c. 2811. 
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of Ameer, but in the convulsed state of the country 
he possessed little real power or authority. I n  May, 
1879, he met the British authorities at Gundamuk, 
and after considerable discussion signed a treaty, the 
chief points of which were as follows :-The foreign 
affairs of Afghanistan were to be under our guidance; 
and we ulldertook to support the Ameer against 
foreign aggression ; British agents were to reside i11 
tlie country ; the Koorum, Pisheen, ancl. Sibi Valleys 
were assigned to the British Goverainent ; and finally, 
Yalroob Khan was to receive an annual subsidy of 
60,0001. 
So far, it would appear as if the campaign had at 
once realised the main objects of British policy ; but 
tragic events rapidly followed, active hostilities mere 
resumed, and t.he Treaty of Gundamuk became mere 
waste paper. 
As a first result of the treaty, Sir Louis Cavag- 
nari was appointed our Envoy, and accompanied 
l ~ y  a few officers and a small escort, arrived at Cabul 
in July, being received in a friendly manner by the 
Anleer ; althougll influences adverse to his presence 
in the capital soon became apparent. Suddenly, on 
September 3, the British Residency was attacked by 
several Afghan regiments, and after a desperate 
resistance, Cavagnari and tlie whole of his officers 
and escort perished. 
Afghaniatam, 1881, No. 1, 
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This deplorable event, of course, upset all pre- 
vious arrangements, and led to an immediate resump- 
tion of hostilities. Our troops at once advanced and 
,aptured Cabul, Yakoob Khan voluntarily abdicating 
becoming an exile in India. Ghuznee also was 
occupied shortly afterwards by our advance from 
Csndahar. 
The Government of India, in a despatclz in 
January, 1880, pointed out that, in view of the com- 
plete change in the political situation, it was neces- 
sary, in the first place, fully to establish our military 
position in the country. They acknowledged that the 
liopes entertained of establishing a strong, friendly, 
and independent kingdom on our frontier had 
collapsed ; and that Afghanistan had fallen to pieces 
at the f i s t  blow, its provinces being now discon- 
nected and masterless. In  view of these unexpected 
results, they went on to recommend the permanent 
separatioii of the provinces under separate rulers ; 
and having regard to the special difficulties con- 
nected with Herat, advocated its being handed over 
to Persia ! I 
This was indeed a policy of despair ! 3 
Lord Hartington, who had become Secretary of 
8 tate for India, writing in May, 1880, summed up the 
situation as follows :-' It appears that as the result 
of two successful campaigns, of the employment 
of an enormous force, and of the expenditure of 
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large sums of money, all that has yet been accom- 
plished has been the disintegration of the State 
which it was desired to see strong, friendly and 
independent ; the assumption of fresh and unwel- 
come liabilities in regard to one of its provinces, and 
a condition of anarchy throughout the remainder of 
the country.' 
Long and careful consideration was naturally 
given to the solution of the difficulty in which this 
country found itself owing to the untoward circum- 
stances just related. Two important decisions were 
liowever ultimately arrived at : ' 
I. That authority in Afghanistan, and the unity 
of its provinces, should as far as possible be restored 
by the appointment of a new Ameer ; and Abdul 
Rahman, a nephew of Shere Ali, who had been for 
twelve years an exile in Bokhara, was invited to 
Cabul, and was supported by us in assuming the 
title. 
The chief conditions were, that his foreign policy 
was to be under our guidance, that no English officers 
were to reside as our representatives in Afghanistan, 
and that he was to receive a subsidy. 
2. That the British troops should be withdrawn 
as soon as the pacification of the country would 
permit. This decision was recommended not only 
by the Viceroy, the Marquis of Ripon, but  by the> 
" Afgl~aniatan, 1881, No. 1. . 1 
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higller officers who had held command cluriiig the 
war. Sir ~ o n a l d  Stewart, who was in chief com- 
mand, and Sir Frederick Roberts, both concurred in 
our wit,hdrawal from the country ; the Kyber Pass was 
to be held by subsidised tribes, and tlie Koorum Valley 
to be altogether abandoned ; the indepenclence of 
the tribes being in each case recognised. Sir John 
Watson, who was in commaild in that valley, pointed 
out that as a route from India into Afghanistan it 
was practically useless. As a further argument in 
favour of witlldrawal, it may be well to allude to 
the fact that tlie men of our native re&' +iments were 
sick of serving in Afghanistan, far away from their 
homes, and that it would be impolitic to keep them 
there. 
/Some differences of opinion existed as to whether 
v e  should relinquish possession of Candahar ; but as 
it was 400 miles from the Indus, in a foreign 
country, and as our remaining there would not only 
be hateful to the Afghans, but in a military sense 
would be dangerous and costly, its final abandonment 
was decided on ; the valley of Pisheen, between 
Candahar and Quetta, being alone retained by the 
British Government. / 
So ended the great war of 1878-80. At its close 
we had over 70,000 men in Afghanistan, or on the 
border in reserve ; and even then we really only held 
the territory within range of our guns. The whole 
4% INDIAN FRONTIER POLICY 1881 
country had been disintegrated and was in anarchy ; 
whilst the total cost, of the war exceeded twenty 
millions sterling, being about the same amount as had 
been expended in the former great was of 1839-41. 
The military operations in themselves had been 
conducted throughout with great skill in a most 
difficult country, and the troops, both British and 
Native, had provecl themselves admirable soldiers ; 
but as regards the policy which led us into war, it  
appears to have been as unjust in principle as it  was 
unfortunate in result. The facts, however, speak for 
themselves. . 
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CHAPTER 111 
FRONTIEIt POLICY SINCE SECOND AFGHAN WAR, 
IR'CLUDIBG EXPEDITION TO CI-TITRAL 
Further Advance of Russia-Merv Occupied-Sir West Ridgeway's 
Frontier Commission of 1885-The Durmd Agreement with Ahdill 
Rahman-The Chitral Expedition of 1895 : its Results-Sudden 
Outbreak of Frontier Tribos, 1897. 
THE reaction after t,he war naturally inclined the 
authorities in both countries to leave frontier policy 
alone, at all events for the time. Our professed 
object for years had been to make Afghanistan 
strong, friendly, and independent. The first had 
certainly not been accomplished, and the other two 
were doubtful. Still, by patience, conciliation, and 
subsidies, we might hope in the course of time that 
the wounds we had inflicted would gradually be 
healed, and a more stable condition ensue. For a 
short period it was so; but then the old bugbear of 
Russian advance over the dreary wastes of Central 
Asia again supervened, and exercised its malign 
influence 011 our policy. 
In 1881 and the following years, Russia, whilst 
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I completing her conquests, and improving her com- 
munications in the south-western part of Central 
Asia, became involved in somewhat prolonged 
hostilities with the Tekke-Turcomans, ending in 
their subjugation, and in the occupation of the 
long, desolate strip of country extending eastwards 
from the Caspian, which had hitherto been inde- 
pendent. A railway was gradually constructed 
from the vicinity of Kras-novodsk, on the Caspian, 
towards Samarcand. Merv, formerly a city of 
importance, but of late a mere village in the desert, 
was also occupied. These acquisitions of Russia, 
accomplished in districts far removed from India, 
would not appear to involve any special considera- 
tion on our part;  but as the southern frontiers of 
Russia thus became conterminous for a long distance 
with Northern Persia, and also with some districts of 
I I Afghanistan, their new position was regarded as I 
possibly involving designs against our Indian Empire, i 
and remonstrances were made by us, more especially I 
as regards the occupation of 3Ierv.l ' 
I n  a strategical point of view the question would I 
1 
not appear to be of much importance, and would j 
4 probably have dropped; but early in 1885 tlie 1 
Russians attacked and drove the Afghan troops out i 
i of Penjdeh, a small, hitherto almost unknown village I 
in tlie desert. I t  was a high-handed measure, and 
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i i ~ g  her com- 
rt  of Central 
at prolonged 
ts, enclirrg iu 
)ation of the 
Lug enst~vards 
LO been inde- 
constructed 
L the Caspinu, 
~y s city of 
in tlie desert, 
311s of Xussia, 
3 frorn India, 
:ial considera- 
.n frontiers of 
I long ilistaoce 
m e  districts of 
3 regarded as 
[nclian Empire, 
pore especially 
guestion would 
, nntl XTOP )I in  lSS5 tlie an troops out 
known village 
measure, and 
1885 DIFFICULTIES WITH RUSSIA 45 
tile relations between the two Governments, British 
find Russian, which mere already rather drained, 
became critical, and war at one moment appeared to 
be all~lost inevitable. 
I t  is not necessary, nor would it be desirable, now 
to recapitulate the details of this serious crisis; 
because, happily, owing to the prudence exercised 
by both Governments, the danger gradually passed 
away, a Joint Camlnission being agreed on, to meet 
on the frontier, and to report as to its delimitation. 
"It may, llowever, be as well to mention that it seems 
rather doubtful wllether Penjdeh at the time abso- 
lutely belonged to Afghanistan. Frontiers in the East 
are proverbially uncertain and shifting, and in our 
own official maps, not very long before the occur- 
rences in question, it was marked as outside the 
Afghan border. Colonel Stewart, reporting in 1884 
on the northern frontier of Afghanistan, and alluding 
to Penjdell, said that it was inhabited by Turcomans, 
and he thus described the position : ' The state of 
affairs seems to hare been that the Turcomans 
acknowledged that they were squatting on Afghan 
land, and were liable to pay taxes, and each year 
they paid something as an acknowledgnlent of 
Afghan rights ; but so long as this was done, the 
Afghans looked upon them as a protection against 
the Tekke further north, and left them very much to 
.themselves.' 
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The appointment of a Joint Commission of Russian 
and British officers to delimit the northern frontiers 
of Afghanistan proved of great value, not only in 
pining information regarding districts hitherto but 
little known, but also because its conjoint work 
tended to engender feelings of respect and goodwill 
between the two ilations concerned. 
Its labours commenced in the autumn of 1885, 
and the report of Sir West Ridgeway, the British 
Commissioner, is full of interest and encouragement. 
In an article in the ' Nineteenth Century ' of October, 
1887, on the coinpletion of his work, he gives some 
details of the country, and also of the position of 
Russia in Central Asia, which are worth quoting. As 
to the Afghan border he says: 'The three or four 
hundred miles of country through which the new 
north-western frontier of Afghanistan runs is a 
sandy, treeless, waterless desert, except where it is 
traversed froin south to north by tlie Heri-Rood, the 
Murghab and the Oxus. The only cultivable ground is 
on the banks of these rivers ; but in spring time, afLer 
the winter snows have melted, the intervening plains 
afford good grazing for sheep.' But perhaps the 
most important part of his article is his view of the 
position of Russia in Central Asia : ' If any Russian 
general,' he writes, ' were so reckless as to attempt 
the invasion of India, ancl relying on the single line 
of lightly constructed rails which connects the Caspian 
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Tvith tile Oxus, and which are liable in summer $0 be 
bloclred by the moving sands of the desert, and in 
winter by the falli~lg sllows of Reaven-if, relying on 
this frail and precarious base, he were to move an 
srnly tl~rough the barren plains bordering: the Oxus, 
nncl leaving in his rear the various hostile and excited 
races of Central Asia, he mere to cross the difficult 
pa~ges of the IIilldoo Koosh, and entangle his army 
in tlle barren mountain homes of the fanatical and 
treac11e1-ous Afghan, then indeed our fortunate 
generals may well congratulate themselves that the 
Lord has delivered tlie enemy into their hand. . . .' 
Whilst, lzowever, his conclusions as to the military 
weakness of Russia in that part of the worlcl are 
clear aid decisive enough, he at the same time does 
full justice to the good work whicll she is carrying 
out in tliat vast area. He says : 'Hitherto Russia's 
advzllice in Central Asia has been the triumph of 
civilisation. Wherever she has planted her flag 
slavery has ceased to exist. This was keenly brought 
home to us in the course of our travels. For hull- 
dreds of miles before we reached Herat we foulla the 
counlry desolated and depopulated by Turcomall 
raids, while even in the Herat valley we contillually 
came across the fathers and brothers of nlen who ha$ 
been carried off from their peaceful fields by 
stealillg Turcomans, and sold into slavery many bun- 
dred miles away. All this has ceased since the 
F- r: * .  Russian occupation of Merv ; the cruel slave trade 
7, + %. 
, ,/' 
a 1 
has been stamped out. . . .' 
1 2  Lord Salisbury, speaking in 1887, at the conclusion 
I 1  
of the frontier clelimitation, happily described the 
situation as follows : 'I value the settlement for this 
reason-not that I attach much importance to the 
, . .  square miles of desert land with which we have been 
dealing, and which probably after ten generations of 
, . 
mankind will not yield the slightest value to any 
human being : but the settlement indicates on both 
j sides that spirit which in the two Governments is 
* 
__- consistent with continued peace. There is abundant 
- room for both Governments, if they would only think 
1 .! 
3 % 
so. . . .' What a pity that some statesman could 
not have persuaded England to that effect fifty years 
before ! 
During the next few years no events of special 
importance occurred to affect our general frontier i 
policy in India, so far as Russia and Afghanistan 
proper are concerned. The ample information we 1 
I 
now possess of the relative power and position of I i
each country, and the experience gained in bygone 1 ! 
wars, enable us to form a correct judgment of the 
great strength of our Empire in the East ; and it is 
to be hoped that in the future we shall hear less o f  
those alarmist views wliich have so frequently led u s  1 
into erroneous policy and untoward expeditions. 
Russia and England are now, happily, on friendly 
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terms, and Abdul Rahman, the Alneer of Cabul, 
al tho~gll  his position is difficult in the midst of a 
turbulent people, has proved himself a. loyal neigll- 
bour. 
But another cloud has appeared on the horizon, 
and our troubles wit11 the intervening frontier tribes 
are now apparently worse than ever. Prom accounts 
already given of those who dwell along the border, it 
is evident that although our differences w i ~ h  them, 
during past years, have been frequent and often 
serious, they have been more or less of a locd 
character. Troublesome as our neighbours have 
proved, still they h a ~ ~ e  no power of inflicting serious 
ii~jury, or of endangering our rule. Under tlicse 
circumstances, the best policy, ml~ilst firmly repress- 
ing their predatory instincts, is to leave them alo~e.  
I11 the absence of full official infoilation as to 
the origin of recent difficullies, which have culmin- 
ated in the present frontier war, it is only possible to 
speak in general terms. I t  may be mentioned, in 
the first place, that owing to the uncertain line of 
demarcation between the territories of tlie Anleer of 
Cabul and those of his independent tribal neigllbours, 
constant feu& and local liostilities occurred from 
time to time in the mountains; and with a viev of 
defining their respective spheres, the Government of 
India, in 189 3, sent a Mission to Cabul for the purpose. 
This in itself would appear to have been a reasonrtl~le 
E 
i 
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step ; and the 'Durand Agreement ' which ensued 
(but which has not been published) would, it was' 
hoped, tend to a cessation of conflicts between the 
Ameer's subjects and their neighbours. But there 
is a further aspect; of the question. So far as is 
known, not only were the respective borders laid 
down, but it is understood that in nlany cases the 
interrening tribes are now ,assumed to be what is 
termed ' within the sphere of British influence.' In  
maps recently published, presumably with some 
authority, vast mountainous districts are now 
included in this somewhat nlysterious phrase. For 
instance, the Koorum Valley, the Samana Range, the 
countries of the Afredis and the Mohmunds, the 
districts of Chitral, Bajour, Dir, Swat, Bonair, and 
others, are all included within it ; and in many 
instances fortified positions, occupied by British 
troops, are t o  be fonnd either within or along their 
borders. 
Surely this opens out a wide question, and it 
would be interesting to know whether, in the 
discussions at Cabul, the chiefs of the intervening 
tribes were present, and vhether they acquiesced, 
not only in the new boundaries, but also in being 
included as within our sphere of influence ? I t  is 
evident it should have been a tripartite, and not a 
dual, agreement. I t  is perfectly well known, and { 
has been proved by long experience, that these 
: cy e' 1893 
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~ h i ~ l '  ensued frontier tribes value their inclepcndencc a1lil liberties 
) woul~l, it l~eyond everytlling else, and will not submit peace- 
3ts be&d een the 1 fully to irrterfereiice ; and if they  ere riot collsulterl 
upa. p o t  there 1 ill the arrangements just ilescribed, rve lllny begin to 
I' So far as ig trace the origin of the present crisis. 
P@ bof clers laid Although, ns I have espl:~ineil, we are unxl~le, 
nl"lq7 cases the I from mant of ofIicial information, to cied f~illv ~ v i t l ~  to b e  what is the larger topic of recent border policy, me ~~:LTTC, at 
L in f luence .  In a11 events, ample details as regards the C!llitr:~l 
bly 4 t h  some question in the Parliamentary Papers pnblisllcti iu 
ricts are  now 
j 1895. It appears that so long ago as Is:(; the 
I S  ph*se. For 9 
I ruler of Cllitral voluntarily tendel.ecl his allryinncc to 
nana aange ,  the I the MallarLzjal~ of Cashmere, and encicavo~tretl, btlt M o h m u z ' d s ,  the I witllont success, to persuade the neiglibouri~lg chiers 
 at,   on air, and of Swat, Bajonr, and Dir, to follow liis cxnmple. 
and in many Now Chitral and Caslimere are not only far :q~art, 
ied by British but are separated by lofty monnt,zin ranges, i~ihnl~ited 
or a long  their , by other tribes, so tlial; this suciilen ofkr of vassalage 
k 
seems rather inexplicable. It transpired, 11011-ever, :L 
luestion, and it few years afterm~a~ds, that his r ed  ~notive in seeliirlg 
&ether, in the the friendship of Cashmere was due to his fcw of 
the ill t ervening aggression by the Anleer of C a b ~ l . ~  
hey acquiesced, The Governmeilt of Inciia at  the time encour:~ged 
~t also in being this somewhat sentimelltd friendship, and in order 
nfluence ? It is to obtain influence over the intervening tribes 
rtite, and not a established a fort at Gilgit, in nn alnlost inaccessible 
-ell knomn, and position, not far from the snowy crests of the Hindoo 
nce, t h a t  these 1 ~07th-Weat Frontier, Chitml, 1896, ? Ibit7. page 40. 
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Icoosh. The position, however, proved to be costly, 
also dangerous from unfriendly neigllbours, and, 
as after three years' experience no special object 
was attained, it was witl~drawn in 1881. 
In 1889 the old fears of possible Russian aggres- 
sion again revived, and Gilgit was reoccupied with a 
strong detachinent of Cashmere troops, accompanied 
by several English officers. The Government of 
I ~ ~ d i a  pointed out that the development of Russian 
military resources in Asia rendered it necessary t o  
watch the passes over the mountains, in order to 
prevent what was called a c o z p  de naain from the 
north. In short, they dreaded the march of a 
Russian army over the Pamirs and the Hindoo 
Koosh-a region where Nature has constructed for u s  
perhaps one of the most formidable frontiers in the 
world. 
Friel-~dsliip with the ruler of Chitral was a l s o  
cultivated. He was given an annual subsidy, and a 
present of 500 Sniders ; being visited also by Eng- 
lish officers. I t  was even contemplated at the t i m e  
to construct a direct road from his capital to o u r  
frontier near Peshswur ; but as he was suspicious, 
and as his neighbonrs in Swat, Bajour, and o t h e r s  
would probably have objecl;ed, the suggestion was 
happily pos Lponed. 
In  October 1892 the ruler of Chitral died, a n d  
after the usual family contests and intrigues, N i z a m  
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ul-Mnlk, liis son, establisliecl liis authority in tilt! 
country. 
111 January, 1899, nr. Rol~crtsoii arsivcid at 
Cliitral as our representatii-e, accoiul):lnicd l ~ y  two 
officers and fifty Siklis, hltllougll Ile was receivtld 
in a frienrlly mnlliler by tlie new ruler, his ac>co~ult 
of the state of affairs in April Kns iliscoul.:lginS :nit1 
ominous. He wrote : 'JITe src~ll to l)e on s YO~C:LI~O 
here. Matters are no longer inipro~~ing ; tlie aliilo- 
sphere of Cliitral is one of cunspir:lcy :uld intrigue.' 
A few weeks Inter he gave a rnore cliclerf'til account, 
xncl although he descril~ed the pcoldc :IS ficlclc, II(J 
consicierecl that I3nglishmen were s:~fo. It becnnlt~ 
evident, however, that the Kix:11n-nl-;\lnlk was weak 
and unpopular, a ~ l d  Dr. liol~ertson descriI>cil tlic 
coniltry as ' in a distracted state, mcl torn by f:w- 
t ions.' 
Tlie reports of our ilgent, in short, woulil sccili to 
prove that lie was in a false ancl dangerous l~osition, 
a small escort, far away i i ~  the mount:ii~i~, 
about 200 miles froin our frontier. 
I n  J,znuary, 1896, tlie Nizaln was murilered I)y 
his brother, and the mllole coulitry nt once ngnill 
feu into anarchy. Dr. Robertson, ~vllo h:id bee11 
temporarily absent, but llad returned ill Febroar~,  
was besieged in a fort, ~ ~ i t ~ l l  his escort, ~ I l i ch ,  ]lo%-- 
ever, llad been increased to about 290 men. The 
crisis llad come at last, and there \~.r;ls no time to 
spare. 
- -  - - 
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A strong force under Sir Robert Low was 
asselnbled at Peshatvur, and crossed the frontier on 
April 1. I t  inust be poiilted out that, in proceediilg 
to Chitral, the British troops had necessarily to pass 
through a difficult mountaillous country inhabited by 
ilideyenclent tribes; and the Government of India 
issued a proclamatioll in which they pointed out 
that tlieir sole object ' is to put an end to the 
present and to prevent any future ulllawful aggressioa 
on Chitral territory, and that as soon as this object 
has been attained the force would be withdrawn.' 
The proclamatio~l went oil to say, that the Govern- 
illeilt ' have no inteiltioli of permanently occupying 
any territory thro~zgh which Mura Khan's miscon- 
duct may now force them to pass, or of interfering 
~ v i  tli the illdependence of the tribes.' 
The military operations were conducted with 
great skill and rapidity, and Dr. Robertson's small 
garrison, which at one time had been hard pressed, was 
saved : a sruaLl force under Colonel Kelly, which had 
left Gilgit, having by a daring and successful march 
arrived just before the main body from Peshawur. 
The short campaign having thus acconlplished its 
object, the gradual withdrawal of the British troops 
in accordance with the proclamation woulcl seem to 
have been R natural sequence. In the weak, dis- 
tracted state of the country, and in the assumed 
necessity of not loaiug our influence in those clistant 
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regions, the Government of Inrlia, however, considered 
that a road from our frontier to Chitral sliould belllade, 
and certain positions retained in order to guartl it. 
This vital question having been carefully co~lsiciered 
a t  home, the Secretary of State for Inclifi, on Juilr, 
13, 1895, telegraphed to the Viceroy that her 
Majesty's Government regretted they were uilable to 
concur in the proposal. He went on to s:~y tlmt 110 
' military force or European Agent shall be kept at 
Cliitral; that Chitral sllould not be fortified ; silil 
that no road shall be made between Peshn~~ur  and 
Chi tral.' He adcled that a11 positions beyond our 
frontier should be evacuated as speedily as circum- 
stances allowed. 
I t  so happened that within a few days of this im- 
por taut decision a cliange of Governme11 t occurre(2 
a t  home, and the question was recoilsidered; arid o i ~  
August 9, fresh instructions were telegraphed to 
Inclia, by which it was ordered that British troops 
ahould be stationed at the Malalrund Pass, leading 
into Swat, and that other posts up to, and including, 
Chitral, should also be held, and a road made 
through the country. In  short the previous decision 
was entirely reversed. 
Before going further it may be as well to point 
out that this is no mere question between one politi- 
cal party and another. I t  goes far beyond that, and 
we may feel assured that in considering the subject, 
5 6 INDIAN FRONTIER POLICY 1895 
both Governments were actuated by a desire to do 
what was considered best in the interests of the 
Indian Empire. 
Still, it is I think impossible not to regard tlia 
ultimate decision as very unfortunate, and as likely 
I to lead to serious consequences. In a mere military 
point of view, i t  was a. repetition of the policy 
1 
1 pursued of recent years of establishing isolated. 
military posts in countries belonging to others, or 
in their vicinity ; inevitably tending to aggravate 
the tribes, and which in time of trouble, instead of 
increasing our strengtl~, are and have bee11 the 
cause of anxiety to ourselves. Therefore, not only 
. . 
as a matter of policy, but in a purely military 
sense, the arrailgenlent was dangerous. 
1 would further observe that many officers, botli, 
civil and military, inen of the highest chahcter and 
long experience in the Punjaub and its borders, did 
not; hesitate to express tlieir opinions at the time, 
that retribution mould speedily follow,; and their 
anticipations appear now to have been verified. 
Suddenly, not many weeks ago, the people of Swat,,. 
who were said to be friendly, violently attacked our 
position on the Malakund, losing, it is said, 3,000 
men in the attempt ; and also nearly captured a 
fortified post a few miles distant at Chakdara. Not 
only that, but this unexpected outbreak was followed 
by hostilities on the part of the tribes in Bajour, and 8 
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l ~ y  llie AIolini~uiils north uf I'cdl:rwur, :ln(l also 1)y 
tlio ~lfretiis, T Y ~ I O ,  sul)sidi.st~(l 1ry us, llntl for years 
gnarlled the ce1cbr:rteil Iiybcr. 12g:ri11, thtt tri1~c.s 
of the S,am:ttia range, n~id  otllcrs to tllti ~ v t ~ s t  of Iicsh:it, 
rosc: in  :lrins ; nilcl n vc:ry 1:trgc forcbr ~rf  Ilritisl~ trool~s 
llnti to be l)nslir?il for~v:~rd i11 :dl 1i:lstc: to qat111 t11is 
great co~nl~i~ir?d attack 011 tlle prrt  of our 11ei~11- 
bours. C;e~ier:ll Sir XeviHc C'lifill~l)rrl:ii~i, l)crl~:~ps 
tlle gre:ltcst liviiig nntliori ty on fror\tic~r clrtcstio~ls, 
118s ~rrittcri quite reccritly, 1)~)i1ltitlg out tli:~t ~lt~vvr 
previously 11:1ii tliere l~r!c~n n scuil)l:~ncv o f  ~~iiit!. of 
:~ctioii ;tniougst the c1iKcrent tri1)estucu.' 
I 1  lllerc snrcly n~ns t  lmve 11cc.11 sorur vtlry strolig 
keliilg of resciztiiieut mil i11j11stic.c n.liiiall l)rrrt~ght SO 
mm-iy tril)csmcl~ for tlie first tiiilc to cv~n\)illt! ill 
ol~position to ~vlint they eviilciitly c*oi~sitlcrild :lu 
invnsion of their coniltry. 11s rtynrils tllc :\1'1-t>rlis, 
wlio are spoke11 of as treacherous :uid f;iitl~\t~ss, it
mnst be I~onic  in ~iliilil t1i:~t in 1881 v t :  sl~oc~iallj. 
recogniscd tllcir inciepencierice,' :uid liave crtbr si11c1t! 
sul)siilise(I tllelll for the sl)eci:~l 1)urpose of pu:tnliiig 
tdie colrlrnerce througl:l1 tlie Icybcr; :L iitity m-llicll 
they llavc f:titllfully carried out until tlie prest>iit 
summer. Lord Lytton, ~;*lio 1 ~ 3 s  Viceroy \vlion the 
arranpeillellt was proposed at  the encl of the war, 
wrote in 1880 3-L I sincerely hope that the Govern- 
' Saturday Reuietu, 80th Oct. 1897. 
Ajgl~aniafan No. 1, 1881, page 57. Ibiil, pngo 62. 
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merit of India will not be easily persuaded to keep 
troops perinanently stationed in the Kyber. I feel 
i little doubt that such a course would tend rather to 
cause trouble than to keep order. Small bodies of 
troops would be a constant provocation to attack ; 
large bodies woulcl die like flies. . . . .' 
'1 believe that the Pass tribes themselves, if 
properly nlanaged, will prove the best guardians of 
tlie Pass, and be able, as well as willing, to keep it 
open for us, if we make it wort11 their while to do 
SO. . . . .) 
Many of these very men, and those of other tribes 
on the frontier, have for years enlisted in our ranks, 
and have proved to be good soldiers. I repeat that 
some strong cause must have influenced them sud- 
clenly to break out into war. 
Until the present military operations have been 
brought to a close, and until full official information 
has been given of the circumstances which have led 
to  them, it is not possible to pronounce a final 
judgment ; still, it seems to me, that we have strong 
grounds for believing that the border policy of late 
pears has in many instances been too aggressive and 
regardless of the rights of the tribes ; and that the 
course finally pursuedof the retention of fortified posts 
through Swat and Bajour to Chitral, has been the 
ultimate cause which has excited the people against 
IssIssv--" . - - - ,  - - .  
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us, and produced so great and costly a border var. 
It must also not be forgotten, that even nom we are 
merely on tlle fringe, as it were, of the question ; and 
that if we persist in forcing ourselves forward, we 
sllall have many a costly campaig~l to undertake far 
away in distant, little-knoan regions, more difficult 
and more inaccessible even than those in vhich we 
now find ourselves. 
On the wliole it appears to ine that we sl~oulil as 
far as possible wichdraw our isolatecl posts, so many 
of tv11ich are either within the tribal country or along 
its borders. I t  is sometimes argued that any with- 
drawal on our part would have a demoralising effect 
on the tribes, tvho would ascribe our retirement 
to inability to maintain our positions.' Tlie best 
reply will perhaps be to quote the words of Lord 
TIartington, when under similar circulnstances it was 
decided in 1881 to retire from Candahar. He said : ' 
'The inoral effect of a scrupulous adherence to 
declarations which have been made, and a striking 
and convincing proof given to the people and princes 
of India that the British Government have no desire 
for further annexation of territory, could not fail 
to produce a most salutary effect, in removing the 
apprehensioas, and strengthening the attachment of 
Chiikal, 1895, page 62. 
I "Afghanistan, No. 1, 1881, page 92. 
, 
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our native allies tl~rougl~out India, alld on our 
frontiers. . , . .' 
These remarks may now be brought to a close. 
My object throughout has been to give an historical 
suinnlary of the various wars and expeclitions in 
which y e  have been engaged during the present 
century on the North-West frontier of India ; and of 
the causes which have led to them. My observatioils 
are founded on Parliamentary official papers, and 
on other works of authority ; and I hope they may 
prove useful to the public, who have not, as a rule 
time to study the intricate details of this difficult 
subject. I have endeavoured to prove that tlle 
tribes oil the frontier, and the people of Afghanistan, 
have 110 real power of injuring our position in India ; 
and turbulent as they may be, a policy of patience, 
conciliation, and subsidies, is far more likely to attain 
our object than incessant costly expeditions into 
their mountains. Our influence over them is already 
great, and is increasing year by year. By carefully 
inaintaining the principles I have sketched out, we 
shall gradually obtain their friendsl~ip, and also their 
support, should other dangers ever threaten our 
dominions. 
We are the rulers of a great Empire in the 
East, with its heavy duties and responsibilities, and 
in devoting ourselves to the welfare of the millions 
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under our sway, and in cleveloping the resources of 
the country, we shall do far more for the happiness 
of the people and the security of the Empire thau 
by squandering our finances in constant expeditions 
beyond its borders, 
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The T I M E S  O F  INDIA.-' The " Recollections of a Military Life " which 
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are in fact more than t h d ,  and the simplc but vigorous English in wfich they 
are told and the modesty with which 11e refers to incidents which made his brother 
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